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The commingling of investigatory, prosecutory, and adjudicatory
functions in administrative agencies has provided a fertile ground for a
steady flow of appeals based on a contention that the commingling
resulted in a violation of the litigant's right to due process of law.' The
concept of commingling is manifested in several ways. First, commingl-
ing may be inherent in the structure of administrative bodies. Second,
commingling might be attributable to two individuals from the same
agency when one discharges an adjudicatory and/or advisory function and
the other performs a prosecutory role. Finally, commingling can occur
solely within a member of an agency.
Arguably, the constitutional requirement of a fair and impartial
tribunal2 is endangered when any of these situations arises in an agency
that not only conducts the investigation and brings charges, but also
adjudicates the case on the merits. Both the appearance 3 and actual
existence of bias is a vital due process concern, but courts in various
jurisdictions have disagreed about when an impermissible commingling
occurs.
Any resolution of this problem must acknowledge that agencies were
purposely established to exercise combined functions to provide a more
efficient, unified method of achieving a specific statutory goal.4 Any
procedure designed to eliminate commingling that does not consider these
objectives could blunt the effectiveness of administrative agencies and
cause greater harm to the public good than any combination of functions.
1. E.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
2. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
3. "[T]o perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appear-
ance of justice.' " Id. at 136.
4. E.g., Bagge, Should Prosecutors Write Agency Opinions? The Role of Agency
Counsel in Decision-Making, 22 AD. L. REV. 585, 587 (1970).
II. The Due Process Standards
A. The Federal Standard
1. A Mere Combination of Functions Within An Agency.-Feder-
al law sets the minimum due process standard for the states. In Withrow
v. Larkin,5 the United States Supreme Court held that a mere combina-
tion of functions in an administrative agency does not, without a showing
of actual bias, result in a violation of due process. Larkin, a physician
deprived of his license by the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board for
unprofessional behavior, appealed the decision of the Board to a three-
judge federal district court, alleging that a commingling of functions
within the Board had violated his due process rights. The district court
reversed the Board, 6 but the Supreme Court affirmed the original decision
and stated,
The contention that the combination of investigative and
adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional
risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more
difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a
presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as ad-
judicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented. 7
Thus, a complainant who avers a violation of due process must prove that
the procedures used create such a risk of bias that they must be forbidden,
regardless of the existence of actual bias. Ordinarily, however, the
exercise of inconsistent functions by the same individuals does not violate
due process.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court compared the functions per-
formed by the Board to those of a judge. 8 A judge routinely sits at a
preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to hold a
suspect and then presides at that same defendant's trial, all without fear of
disqualification. Similarly, the Court reasoned the combined functions
exercised by the Board involved no greater risk of bias. In the investiga-
tory stage it was merely attempting to determine the probability that
offenses had occurred, while at the hearing it was reviewing their actual
commission. The Court found that this was a sufficient differentiation of
objectives to satisfy due process requirements.
9
Judges, however, do not conduct their own investigations. The
evidence is presented to them by a separate prosecutory arm of the
5. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
6. Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
7. 421 U.S. at 47.
8. Id. at 56.
9. Id.
government. Moreover, some commentators have noted that an agency,
by conducting the investigation and adjudicating as well, develops a bias
to make a determination of guilt to prove that it was initially correct in
bringing the charges or calling the hearing, 10 The Court summarily
dismissed this contention I and held,
That the combination of investigative and adjudicative func-
tions, does not, without more, constitute a due process viola-
tion, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining
from the special facts and circumstances present in the case
before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Findings
of that kind made by judges with special insights into local
realities are entitled to respect ....
The record did not reveal any bias resulting from the procedures used by
the Board, and, although the Court recognized that certain situations
entailed a "risk of bias" that is not constitutionally acceptable,' 3 it did
not discern such a risk in the instant case.
14
The lower federal courts uniformly adhere to the Withrow standard
that a mere combination of functions within the agency itself does not per
se violate due process.' 5 A party must assume the difficult burden of
alleging and proving actual bias, not merely the appearance of bias that
results from the combination of functions.' 6 Since neither ex parte
10. Davis, Case Commentary: Withrow v. Larkin and the "Separation of Functions"
Concept in State Administrative Proceedings, 27 AD. L. REV. 407 (1975).
ii. The Court said,
The risk of bias or prejudgment in this sequence of functions has not been
considered intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the
adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they
would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or
changed position.
421 U.S. at 57.
12. Id. at 58.
13. Such situations include cases "in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in
the outcome and in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the
party before him." Id. at 47.
14. The Court found that the procedures used by the licensing Board were internally
separated. An agency employee conducted the actual investigation and an assistant attorney
general presented the evidence to the Board. Id. at 54 n.20. While this finding was not
essential to the Court's holding, it is very important to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
consideration of the commingling issue. See notes 34-45 and accompanying text infra.
15. E.g., Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975) (following With-
row); United States v. Litton Industries, 462 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972); Intercontinental Indus.
v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971); FTC v. Cinderella Career &
Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349(ist
Cir. 1962); Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161 (D.N.J. 1976); National
Rifle Ass'n v. United States Postal Service, 407 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1976); Lehigh Portland
Cement Co. v. FTC, 291 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Va. 1968).
16. This is true even when the other function allegedly combined with adjudication is
not investigation or prosecution. In Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville
Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976), striking teachers were discharged by a local school board
after a long and bitter contract battle. The teachers claimed the Board was biased by its prior
involvement in the dispute. The Court held that "the Board's prior role as negotiator [did]
not disqualify it to decide that the public interest in maintaining uninterrupted classroom
work required that teachers striking in violation of state law be discharged." Id. at 494.
On almost identical facts, the court in Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.
1973), held that school boards often act as negotiators and to deny them the role of
communications17 nor the influences of such communications appear on
the record, the less onerous standard of some jurisdictions would be
appropriate. 18
2. A Combination of Functions Within an Individual.-In In re
Murchison'9 the Supreme Court invalidated a proceeding in which a
judge held two witnesses in contempt for failure fully to cooperate with
him at a one-judge secret grand jury. The Court's opinion alluded to the
necessity of avoiding not only actual bias but the appearance of bias as
well.2' It also noted that in addition to several other considerations, 21 one
element especially applicable to one-man commingling situations was the
judge's inability to disregard the information adduced at the grand jury
sessions. In the later contempt hearings the trier of fact should rely solely
upon the evidence there presented. The Court, however, doubted a
judge's capacity to filter out his personal impressions of prior sessions
regardless of his honesty.
An active involvement in two inconsistent functions is the essential
element in one-person commingling situations. A prosecutor might still
not violate due process, even when he assumes both prosecutory and
adjudicatory roles, if he exercises only a passive role in the adjudication.
The facts are crucial.
Thus, in almost identical fact situations the courts in Citta v. Dela-
ware Valley Hospital22 and Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hospital23 reached
adjudicator would force the decision of teacher retention onto less experienced bodies.
Absent actual bias the Board's prior role as negotiator did not violate due process.
17. Ex parte communications are informal, off-the-record discussions among agency
officials and litigants in a particular dispute or informal discussions among agency officials
charged with separate functions in the litigation. See Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex
Parte Communications with Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REV. 223, 235 (1962). To
the extent that discussions among agency prosecutors and adjudicators influence the deci-
sion in the formal hearing, bias results.
18. See note 110 and accompanying text infra.
19. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
20. The Court stated,
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law
has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end
no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where
he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision.
Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This Court has said, how-
ever, that 'every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State
and the accused denies the latter due process of law.' [citation omitted] Such a
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who
would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending
parties. But to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.' [citation omitted]
Id. at 136.
21. The Court recognized a distinction between contempt committed in open court
and before a grand jury conducted by a single judge. Id. at 134. It also noted that the
defendant could not rely upon any disinterested witnesses since the grand jury proceeding
was conducted in secrecy. Id. at 138. Finally, the judge, as the only witness, would have
been required to pass on his own testimony or the defendant would have had to forego an
adequate cross-examination of the only witness to the charge. Id. at 139.
22. 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
23. 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
opposite conclusions about the dual role played by the prosecuting doctor
in each case. In Citta the doctor's dual function included initiating the
restrictions on the plaintiff physician's hospital privileges and presiding at
the hearing making those restrictions permanent. At the conclusion of the
hearing the vote was taken immediately by secret ballot without discus-
sion. It was unclear whether the doctor actually voted but the court found
that due process was not violated because the doctor's vote would not
have been decisive. In Hoberman the prosecuting doctor not only brought
the charges but also presented evidence at the hearing and actively
participated in the discussions of the hearing panel before the announce-
ment of its decision.
24
The distinguishing factor between the two cases is the nature and
extent of the participation by the two doctor-prosecutors. In Hoberman a
due process violation was found because of the doctor's opportunity to
influence the other members of the hearing body. In Citta the vote taken
at the conclusion of the hearing would preclude the presiding officer from
biasing the other members of the hearing panel. In addition, to the extent
that the presiding officer exercises a relatively passive role25 because of
the liberal rules of evidence in administrative proceedings, the impartiali-
ty of the proceeding was not destroyed. The only active role was that of
prosecutor, and no dual function actually resulted.
The standard formulated by these cases is a sound one. An individu-
al should not take an active part in two inconsistent functions, 26 but when
his functions are so structured that he cannot influence the hearing
board's decision after having taken part in the prosecution, due process is
preserved.
The decisions, however, are not uniform. In National Rifle Associa-
tion of America v. United States Postal Service, 27 plaintiff, who had been
denied a special mail rate by the Manager of the Office of Mail Classifica-
tion, contended that the Manager's combined rulemaking, adjudicatory,
and investigatory powers violated due process. Citing Withrow v. Lar-
kin, 28 the court stated that "the combination of functions in the same
official or agency is not, without more, a violation of due process."
29
24. Although the court found what would otherwise be a clear violation of due
process, it refused to reverse the decision of the hospital board since the proceedings did not
rise to the level of state action. Id. at 1186.
25. See Citta v. Lock Haven Hospital, 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970); but see
Donnon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971).
The passivity can extend in either direction. In Converse v. Udall, 262 F. Supp. 583 (D.
Ore. 1966), the hearing examiner merely signed the notice for the hearing. Since he had not
instituted the proceedings, there could be no valid claim of commingling of the prosecutory
and adjudicatory roles.
26. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Amos Treat & Co. v.
SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
27. 407 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1976).
28. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
29. 407 F. Supp. at 92 (emphasis added). It is difficult to understand how the court
could determine that a combination within the same person is not a violation of due process.
Under the Withrow standard, plaintiff had to present special facts and
circumstances showing that the risk of bias was intolerably high.3" In
disregarding the standard promulgated by Murchison, the court placed an
unjustifiably heavy burden on the complainant to demonstrate the actual
bias of the adjudicator.
3. Procedures Not Involving a Combination of Functions-The
federal courts have also rejected claims that due process was violated by a
combination of functions when these functions had been separated by the
agency to the courts' satisfaction, 3' or when the courts found that the
agency had only exercised an investigative function.
32
B. The Pennsylvania Standard
1. A Mere Combination of Functions within an Agency.
(a) The supreme court standard.-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
allows the same agency to prosecute and adjudicate if these functions are
adequately separated within the agency. 33 If they are not, the proceeding
will be invalidated even if actual bias is not present in the record. 34
In In re Schlesinger35 the supreme court found that a disbarred
attorney's due process rights had been violated because the Committee on
Withrow addressed the issue of commingling solely within an agency. In re Murchison
should have disposed of the question of commingling within an individual. Furthermore, in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court ruled that a pretermination hearing must
be held before welfare payments can be terminated. Concerning procedure the Court said,
"He [the decision maker] should not, however, have participated in making the determina-
tion [to stop welfare payments]." Id. at 271. This would seem to be sufficient precedent to
prevent the Manager in National Rifle Association from conducting the review of his own
initial decision to deny the special rates.
30. The court found those special facts and circumstances in the Manager's issuance
of a letter denying the plaintiff's eligibility for the special rates before the second determina-
tion. If the Manager had not couched his determination so definitely (i.e., if he had only
found "probable cause" to deny eligibility), he could have constitutionally adjudicated both
applications. The initial determination presented a situation in which the Manager could
become psychologically tied to his position. 407 F. Supp. at 94.
31. Rite Aid Corp. v. Board of Pharmacy, 421 F. Supp. 1161 (D.N.J. 1976) (adequate
separation when the Board referred charges to the Enforcement Bureau of the Division of
Consumer Affairs, a hearing officer provided by the Attorney General presided over the
Board's hearing, and the Board was limited to a review of his findings); Woodland Nursing
Corp. v. Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[due process] does not,
however, prohibit a single agency from combining investigative and adjudicative functions,
one group or individual passing upon facts developed by others within the same organiza-
tion") (citation omitted).
32. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 465
F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1972).
33. The state supreme court has not stated whether the separation should be formal or
informal. Its opinion in State Dental Counci Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318
A.2d 910 (1974), would indicate an informal separation is sufficient. Thus, there is an
adequate separation when no one person or group of persons actively takes part in two
inconsistent functions. One person or group, however, can pass upon facts developed by
others in the same agency. See note 31 supra.
34. State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974).
35. 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
Offenses had combined the functions of prosecutor and judge.3 6 It relied
upon the sweeping language of In re Murchison37 to support its position,
although the latter case could have been distinguished because it involved
a one-judge grand jury. The supreme court held,
In such a procedure [the trial body composed of members of the
charging body], so contrary to traditional American judicial
concepts, unfairness was, ipso facto, inherent; it was fraught
with the possibility of temptation of each member of the trial
tribunal to favor, consciously or unconsciously, the prosecuting
body which appointed him and of which he was a mem-
ber. . . . Moreover, a predilection to favor one side over the
other is not required in order to vitiate a judicial proceeding as
being violative of due process. Merely 'a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge * * * not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true' is sufficient. Such 'a possible temptation' was
implicit in the proceeding before the prosecutor's own Subcom-
mittee which resulted in appellant's disbarment.38
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court embraced the language of In
re Murchison in a situation that the United States Supreme Court would
subsequently find merited rejection of the very same sweeping
generalities. 39 "[A] predilection to favor one side over the other is not
required" to invalidate the proceeding; thus, actual bias need not be
present. This is a much higher standard than the rule accepted by the
majority of other jurisdictions, 40 which would provide that there is noth-
ing inherently unfair in permitting persons from the same administrative
body to prosecute and adjudicate.
The Pennsylvania standard was more recently articulated in State
Dental Council and Examining Board v. Pollock.4 A dentist whose
license had been revoked challenged the roles played by the Board in
investigating the complaint, prosecuting the action, and adjudicating its
merits. He also questioned the propriety of allowing the assistant attorney
general who prosecuted the case to write the opinion for the Board.4 2 The
36. The Committee on Offenses of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
notified Schlesinger of the charges it intended to bring against him. It also appointed a
subcommittee to conduct the hearings, and the subcommittee recommended that Schlesin-
ger be disbarred. The Committee adopted the report and, in turn, submitted it to the
common pleas court, which ultimately disbarred Schlesinger. Id. at 589, 172 A.2d at 836.
37. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
38. 404 Pa. at 598, 172 A.2d at 841.
39. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
40. See note 109 and accompanying text infra. The outcome of Schlesinger would
probably have been the same regardless of the standard applied, since the opinion shows
that the Committee was indeed personally biased against the appellant. The court clearly
indicated that this circumstance was not essential to its holding because the Committee
"acted, directly and through its subcommittee (consisting of three of its own members), as
prosecutor, judge and jury at the hearing on the Committee's own complaint against the
appellant." 404 Pa. at 600, 172 A.2d at 842.
41. 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974).
42. The supreme court found no due process violation when the prosecutor wrote the
opinion for the Board since this assistance came after the decisional process was complete
and the prosecutor merely summarized the court's findings. Id. at 272, 318 A.2d at 915.
court once again cited Murchison for the necessity of preventing "even
the probability of unfairness" 43 and stated,
Our task, therefore, is to examine the particular procedures
employed in this case to determine whether there was such 'a
possible temptation' ['to the average man as a judge. . not to
hold the balance, nice, clear and true'] inherent in this adminis-
trative structure.
It is not uncommon for large agencies to fulfill both the
prosecutory and judicial functions (e.g., the Federal Trade
Commission and the Public Utilities Commission). So long as
the functions are separated adequately, Due Process is preserv-
ed. [citation omitted] A fortiori, there is no Due Process viola-
tion in the administrative structure employed here, where both
functions were handled by distinct administrative entities with
no direct affiliation to one another.
44
Thus, the court accepts the same basic premise used by other
jurisdictions: a mere combination of functions within an agency does not
violate due process. While other 'jurisdictions would require the party
alleging injury from commingling to show actual bias to establish a due
process violation, 45 Pennsylvania would require a showing by the agency
that the functions were adequately separated. If the functions are undif-
ferentiated, regardless of whether bias is actually present, the hearing has
the appearance of bias and will be invalidated.
(b) Commonwealth court cases concerning a mere combination of func-
tions within an agency.-In contrast to the clear standard established by
the supreme court decisions for commingling, the commonwealth court
evidences a vacillation between the state supreme court standard and the
federal standard. In Wasniewski v. State Civil Service Commission46 the
commonwealth court, in answering the contention that a commingling of
prosecutory and adjudicatory functions in the same agency resulted in a
denial of due process, relied upon the supreme court's appearance of bias
test to determine the standard by which administrative procedures are to
be measured. The court said,
[I]t is no longer necessary to find actual evidence of bias by an
administrative tribunal to sustain a finding that there was a
denial of due process of law . . . the question before us is:
Absent a showing of actual bias, did the municipality or its
43. Id at 270, 318 A.2d at 914.
44. Id. at 270-71, 318 A.2d at 915. The court accepted the attorney general's allega-
tions about the procedures used in the absence of any contradictory statements by the
appellant. After the Dental Board received the complaint, it turned it over to the Law
Enforcement Bureau of the Commission of Professional and Occupational Affairs. The
latter is, as the court noted, a separate administrative body under the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of State. The Legal Office of the Commission determined that a hearing was warrant-
ed. An assistant attorney general drafted the charges and prosecuted them. Thus, the Board
was adequately insulated from the investigatory and prosecutory functions.
45. See note 109 and accompanying text infra.
46. 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 166, 299 A.2d 676 (1973).
agency provide reasonable procedural safeguards to assure the
protection of the respondent's right to a fair and unbiased
adjudication ?
47
Thus, the court showed its agreement with the supreme court's standard
of review by placing the duty to adequately separate functions on the
administrative agency.
4 8
The decision in Rayne v. Edgewood School District,4 9 decided two
years later, however, relied upon the federal standard. Rayne, challeng-
ing the refusal of the school district to give her a teaching position,
claimed the district violated her due process rights by investigating and
preparing charges before holding a hearing. The court, relying upon the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, stated simply that
Withrow v. Larkin50 clearly established the constitutionality of a combi-
nation of functions in any administrative agency, and that "[t]hat opinion
clearly sets forth the precedents and considerations that required the result
obtained in that case and which must obtain in this case."
5 1
Rayne, therefore, represents a proposition far different from the
principle articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and accepted by
the commonwealth court itself two years before. The commonwealth
court should have determined what procedures were used by the school
district and whether they adequately separated the prosecutory from the
judicial functions. Instead the court, in disregard of prior rulings by the
state supreme court, 52 which presumably interpreted federal law, and,
relying upon the recently articulated standard in Withrow, placed the
burden squarely upon the appellant to show actual bias.53
English v. North East Board of Education 5 illustrates the common-
wealth court's apparent confusion about which standard should be applied
to commingling: the federal standard enunciated in Withrow v. Larkin, 
55
which favors the agency, or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court standard
established by In re Schlesinger,56 which invalidates agency proceedings
for even the appearance of bias. The issue becomes which due process
47. Id. at 170, 299 A.2d at 678 (emphasis in original) (citing Donnon v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 369, 283 A.2d 92, 94 (1971)).
48. The court found no due process violation, however, since the functions were
adequately separated by the agency. The investigation was not conducted by the Board, but
by the Chief of Verification and Personnel Investigation, a nonmember.
49. 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 353, 339 A.2d 151 (1975).
50. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
51. 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 355, 339 A.2d at 153.
52. E.g., State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974); Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584,
172 A.2d 835 (1961).
53. The tenor of the court's opinion indicates that the court considered the appellant's
commingling contention frivolous.
54. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 240, 348 A.2d 494 (1975).
55. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
56. 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
clause, federal or state, is being interpreted.5 7 English, a discharged
school teacher, filed suit in a federal district court alleging a commingling
of the prosecutory and judicial function within the school board's solic-
itor. The district court granted summary judgment for the school board
"without prejudice to the rights she might assert under state law."5 8 On
appeal the commonwealth court stated,
In Horn, it was not made clear whether consideration of state
or federal constitutional law compelled the result. It is clear,
however, that due process is as much required by the state
constitution as by the Fourteenth Amendment. [citation
omitted] In fact, our analysis of two recent decisions convinces
us that our state Supreme Court, presumably as a matter of
state law, is applying a more stringent standard to prevent a
commingling of the judicial and prosecutorial functions than the
United States Supreme Court is presently applying. Compare
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, (decided April 16) to Dussia v.
Barger, - Pa. -, 351 A.2d 667 (1975) (decided October 3).59
This acknowledgement of the stricter standard used by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, while compatible with a few prior cases of the
commonwealth court, is inconsistent with others. For example, Was-
niewski v. State Civil Service Commission60 relied upon the higher state
supreme standard, but the decision in Barr v. Pine Township Board of
Supervisors61 succeeding Wasniewski and preceding English, relied up-
on the federal standard. Moreover, if the decision in English signaled a
return to the proper supreme court standard, that standard was once again
abandoned in Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Appeals Board v. Steve
Black, Inc. ,62 in which the commonwealth court relied upon Withrow v.
Larkin to uphold the administrative procedures there employed.
Bruteyn v. State Dental Council and Examining Board63 sheds light
on the standard the commonwealth court considers appropriate in differ-
ent commingling situations. The court indicated that it will use the
Withrow standard in general commingling situations and the state su-
preme court appearance of bias test when the commingling coalesces in
one agency member.
In Bruteyn the appellant grounded his due process complaint on two
contentions: (1) a general commingling within the Board and (2)
commingling within the deputy attorney general who prosecuted the case,
advised the Board before and during the hearing, and drafted the opinion
57. A state, of course, may impose higher standards of due process based upon the
state constitution's due process clause than the Supreme Court does when the Court
interprets the federal constitution. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
58. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 244, 348 A.2d at 496. The court found a due process
violation when-the solicitor prosecuted the case for the Board and sat as the hearing
examiner.
59. Id.
60. 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 166, 299 A.2d 676 (1973).
61. 20 Pa. Commw. C1. 255, 341 A.2d 581 (1975).
62. 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 21, 365 A.2d 685 (1976).
63. - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 380 A.2d 497 (1977).
adding his own factual determinations to those of the Board.
Rejecting the due process claim based upon general commingling
within the agency, the court noted that a significant number of state
agencies are authorized to investigate, prosecute charges, and adjudicate
on the merits. It found that while "the Board may have supervised the
initial probable cause investigation, . . . [t]he procedures followed...
comport[ed] favorably with those expressly sanctioned in State Dental
Council and Examining Board v. Pollock, . ". ."I The court further
stated that "[slome finding of actual bias is required."65
The commonwealth court is thus unwilling to apply prior supreme
court precedent to general commingling situations. The court fears that
requiring anything less than a showing of actual bias would significantly
impair the ability of the state's administrative bodies to punish violations
of the law. The state supreme court, however, encountered this same
consideration in Pollock,66 since the Pollock appeal arose not only from
the same backdrop of administrative adjudications, but also from the very
same agency. The supreme court, nevertheless, adhered to the appear-
ance of bias test and eschewed the need to find actual prejudice.
The commonwealth court's double standard of review that depends
upon the factual context of each case became more evident in the court's
resolution of the contention that the deputy attorney general who prose-
cuted the case commingled functions. The court made it clear that
although it required proof of actual prejudice in general commingling
situations, it "by no means intend[ed] to compromise prior decisional law
condemning procedures which conjoin in an individual the prosecutorial
and judicial functions." 67 The latter "situation differs markedly in sub-
stance from that in which the exigencies of modern corporate government
require that one entity within a particular agency make the decision to
prosecute, and another to sit as adjudicator.' '68 Referring to the actions of
the prosecuting attorney, the court found that the totality of the circum-
stances69 "creat[ed] a sufficient appearance of impropriety" 70 to reverse
the Board's decision even though the court was not convinced the appel-
lant suffered any actual prejudice.
Although the court concluded that the procedures in issue "comport-
64. Id. at -,380 A.2d at 500-01.
65. Id. at-, 380 A.2d at 501.
66. 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974).
67. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 380 A.2d at 501. For a discussion of the one-person
commingling situation, see notes 92-104 and accompanying text infra.
68. Id. at -, 380 A.2d at 501.
69. The deputy attorney general provided prehearing advice to the Board as well as
legal advice during the hearing. Id. at -, 380 A.2d at 499. He also drafted the opinion for the
Board and added his own factual findings. Id. at -, 380 A.2d at 502. While the advice given
during the hearing was from the prosecutor's immediate supervisor and by itself would not
have been sufficient to invalidate the proceedings in combination with the other factors it
was sufficient for reversal of the Board's decision. Id. at -, 380 A.2d at 502.
70. Id. at -, 380 A.2d at 502.
ed favorably" with the procedures followed in Pollock, there is, as the
dissent properly noted, a crucial factual distinction between the two
cases. In Pollock the State Dental Board immediately turned the third
party complaint over to an independent investigatory body that decided to
prosecute. In Bruteyn, in contrast, the Board itself recommended that a
formal hearing be held and the court admitted that the Board "partici-
pated in the initial decision to prosecute.''71 This circumstance should
have brought the case within the rule that the person who institutes a
prosecution should not also adjudicate. 72 Given the supreme court's
concern with even the appearance of bias, it seems a stricter rule should
have applied in this case. Members of a collegial body should not be
permitted to engage in inconsistent functions as a group when they would
not be permitted to do so as individuals.
Bruteyn thus erodes the supreme court's safeguards against
commingling. Furthermore, although it does not expressly reject the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court standard, it expressly adopts a contrary
rule. The supreme court's opinions do not support the adoption of a two-
tiered commingling standard-the high court has consistently adhered to
an appearance of bias test while expressly rejecting, regardless of the
facts, any requirement of actual bias.
2. A Combination of Functions within Two Individuals from the
Same Agency .- Only the commonwealth court has addressed the situa-
tion in which two individuals from the same agency combine two incon-
sistent functions. The case law demonstrates a shifting degree of concern
with this type of commingling. Generally, when two attorneys assume
only a prosecutory role and later advise the hearing panel, such internal
bifurcation has not been considered a constitutional violation.7 3 In City of
Philadelphia v. Hays,71 for example, the court approved this type of
commingling by simply finding that the assignment of two attorneys to
the functions of prosecuting and advising insured adequate insulation.
75
In Commonwealth, Human Relations Commission v. Thorp, Reed &
Armstrong,76 the commonwealth court elaborated on its standard of
review in two-person commingling situations. The legal branch of the
Human Relations Commission had assigned an attorney to prosecute the
case and one to advise the hearing panel on legal matters in the suit
71. Id. at -, 380 A.2d at 502.
72. See notes 97-98 and accompanying text infra.
73. Commonwealth, Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorpe, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976); City of Phila. v. Hays, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621, 320
A.2d 406 (1974).
74. 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621, 320 A.2d 406 (1974).
75. The court also distinguished the case from Donnon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971), since Donnon addressed a one-person commingling
situation.
76. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 361 A.2d 497 (1976).
against Thorp, Reed & Armstrong for sex discrimination. The court
stated,
[W]e have two individuals who are both within the same branch
of an administrative entity, one handling a prosecutorial func-
tion and the other separately handling an adjudicatory function.
These circumstances place us at the interface between a
constitutionally permissible and a constitutionally impermiss-
ible commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.7
The court considered the integrity of the fact-finding process of
primary importance because it is the stage of the proceeding most subject
to abuse by biased administrators. 78 Since findings of fact are open to
only limited appellate review, "[tihe fact finding process, . . . must be
afforded the broadest dimension of constitutional protection.
' 79
Nevertheless, the court's concern for impartiality in the fact-finding
process was largely academic because the facts were generally undis-
puted. 80
The court concluded that the two-attorney commingling of advisory
and prosecutory functions was constitutional only because careful exami-
nation of the record revealed no bias. Its attention, however, should have
been focused on the appearance of bias, since the majority admitted that it
is extremely difficult to discern actual bias in an agency's findings of
fact.A It would certainly have been justifiable to err on the side of safety
and reverse the Commission's decision,8 2 particularly because the type of
commingling involved " 'comes perilously close' to a violation of due
process.' 83
77. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 302, 361 A.2d at 501. The court also cited State Bd. of
Medical Educ. & Licensure v. Grumbles, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 74, 347 A.2d 782 (1975), an
earlier decision of the court in which one assistant attorney general prosecuted the charges
before the Board and another prepared the opinion for the Board. The court stated, "If this
dual role of the Board's counsel is not a violation of due process, it comes perilously close to
being so." Id. at 79, 347 A.2d at 785. The court, however, did not decide the case on this
issue, but reversed on other substantive grounds.
78. The following quotation from City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 261 Ind. 670, 310
N.E.2d 65 (1974), is instructive on this point:
Insofar as the findings of fact by an administrative board are concerned, the
reviewing court is bound by them, if they are supported by the evidence. It may not
substitute its judgment for that of the board. [citation omitted] With the authority
of the reviewing court so limited, it is imperative that a strict test of impartiality be
applied to the fact finding procedure. The evidence will be heard and the facts
determined but once. If the facts are to be fairly determined then it must occur at
this stage of the proceedings. It is essential that the fact finders comport to due
process standards.
Id. at 677, 310 N.E.2d at 69.
79. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 302, 361 A.2d at 501.
80. Judge Mencer properly criticized the majority because its concern was limited to
actual bias. Even the appearance of bias had to be eliminated-this was the thrust of the
Pennsylvania decisions. Id. at 310, 361 A.2d at 504.
81. Id. at 302, 361 A.2d at 501.
82. A remand for a new hearing with an adequate separation of functions is the usual
course taken in commingling decisions. Donnon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct.
366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971). A court will sometimes conclusively reverse. See Gardner v.
Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969) (conclusive reversal for long delays and looseness
of procedure).
83. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 301, 361 A.2d at 501.
In addition, exclusive reliance upon the record excludes any con-
sideration of ex parte communication between the attorneys. It is not
inconceivable that the attorneys could have discussed the case informally
outside the appellant's presence or that the prosecuting attorney could
have influenced the advisory attorney in ways not appearing in the record.
All these circumstances militate for a stricter standard than was applied
by the commonwealth court.
84
A situation even more conducive to bias occurs when one person
prosecutes and another agency employee adjudicates. The reasoning of
Thorp, Reed in relying upon a separation of the advisory role from the
fact-finding role cannot apply when the "advisor" is the fact-finder. In
Commonwealth, Department of Insurance v. American Bankers Insur-
ance,85 the commonwealth court stated that due process is violated when
one person prosecutes and a supervisory member of the same agency
adjudicates. The court did not believe a finding of actual bias was
essential to its decision and viewed its holding as a culmination of the
previous two-person commingling cases. While Thorp, Reed was at the
"interface," in American Bankers the line of permissible commingling
was crossed. The appearance of bias could not be tolerated when one
member of the agency was entrusted with the crucial fact-finding process
and the ultimate decision, while a fellow member was entrusted with the
prosecutory function.
The commonwealth court, however, will not always apply the same
strict scrutiny in the two-person commingling of prosecutory and ad-
judicatory functions situation. In Stoffan v. Commonwealth, Department
of Public Welfare ,6 a case that contradicts American Bankers, Stoffan, a
physician barred from further participation in the Pennsylvania Medical
Assistance Program for failure to keep adequate records of his claims to
84. The identical fact situation appeared in Boehm v. Board of Educ., 30 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 468, 373 A.2d 1372 (1977). The court relied upon a lack of evidence of impropriety in the
record to reject the discharged school teacher's claim. The court found that the crucial fact-
finding process was not tainted by bias, since the Board apparently made its own evidentiary
rulings. In other words, the advisor assigned to the Board exercised only a passive role. See
notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
85. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976). The court characterized the
commingling situation as follows:
[T]he Associate Chief Counsel of the Department was appointed a Deputy Insur-
ance Commissioner for the purpose of acting as the hearing examiner at Ameri-
can's hearing before the Department. As a result of this appointment, the associate
counsel who prosecuted the Department's case was the direct subordinate of the
hearing examiner who [had to act] in an impartial judicial capacity.
Id. at 190-91, 363 A.2d at 874.
As this quotation indicates the supervisory power of the Associate Chief Counsel
played an important part in the court's decision. The hearing examiner was a member, in a
supervisory capacity, of the agency which brought the accusations and thus he was disqual-
ified from adjudicating under the rule of Gardner v. Repasky. See note 93 and accompanying
text infra. See State v. Kelly, 145 W. Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1960) (the Deputy Commis-
sioner assigned to hear the case could not be considered impartial because the Commission-
er, his supervisor, investigated and brought the charges).
86. 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203, 375 A.2d 894 (1977).
the DPW alleged that there was a general commingling of the prosecutory
and judicial functions within the agency that was not constitutionally
permissible. The court, in rejecting the appellant's claim, ruled that this
contention required only "cursory treatment" 87 since "these functions
were performed by different persons."
88
In Thorp, Reed, the commonwealth court had declared that when
two people from the same agency separately handled inconsistent func-
tions the court was "at the interface between a constitutionally permissi-
ble and a constitutionally impermissible commingling . . . . 89
Moreover, a meticulous review of the record was performed in Thorp,
Reed to assure the absence of actual bias. Yet in Stoffan, although the
physician apparently claimed only a general commingling within the
agency itself, the commonwealth court supplied an answer that was the
very point at issue in previous cases. 90 The court thus appears to be
retreating from its position in Thorp, Reed, and it is difficult to state the
commonwealth court's present position on the internal bifurcation of
prosecutory and adjudicatory (as opposed to simply advisory) functions.
It appears that each case is decided on its peculiar facts in an ad hoc
manner.
9 1
3. Commingling of Functions within an Individual.
(a) The state supreme court standard.-The cases unanimously agree
that commingling within an individual cannot be constitutionally to-
lerated. 2 If an agency had to show a clear delineation of functions or risk
87. Id. at 206, 375 A.2d at 895.
88. Id. at 207, 375 A.2d at 896. Although the court's holding is vague, other parts of
the opinion indicate there was only one hearing officer. Id. at 206, 375 A.2d at 895.
Furthermore, the record shows there was only one prosecutor at the physician's hearing. Id.
Record at 3a.
The prosecutor also was not the sole investigator. He relied upon the testimony of other
DPW investigators at the hearing. Brief for Appellant at 27. This, therefore, cannot distin-
guish the case from American Bankers in which the prosecutor also had the aid of other
agency investigators. Brief for Appellant at 12, Commonwealth, Dept. of Ins. v. American
Bankers Ins., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976). The issue common to both
cases, then, was the internal bifurcation of prosecution and adjudication between the two
counsel.
89. 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 302, 361 A.2d at 501.
90. The court cited State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318
A.2d 910 (1974), rather than American Bankers or Thorp, Reed.
91. See City of Phila. v. Hays, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 621,629, 320 A.2d 406, 411 (1974).
92. Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745,337 A.2d 858 (1975); Dussia v. Barger,
466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975); Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
These cases all touched upon various situations in which one person charged with adjudicat-
ing performed an inconsistent function in some other capacity as advisor, member of the
prosecuting body, or the prosecuting party. These supreme court decisions were predictable
from the tenor of prior cases. E.g., In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
Apparently, there might be an "executive capacity" exception. In Mallon v. Township
of Upper Moreland, 461 Pa. 241, 336 A.2d 266 (1975) (per curiam), an equally divided
supreme court affirmed the commonwealth court's decision for the township. One of the
members of the Board of Township Commissioners brought the charges against Mallon and
sat on the Board while it adjudicated. Three justices sought to affirm because of a distinc-
tion between the executive capacity and the judicial capacity. They felt the Board, in
violating a litigant's right to due process, the supreme court would surely
reject the contention that a single individual could sufficiently separate
incompatible functions.
In Gardner v. Repasky the supreme court declared, "A man cannot
sit as a judge when he is a member of a board which has brought the
accusations." 93 John Repasky, a member of the Fire Board that dis-
charged the appellant policeman, Gardner, also sat on the Civil Service
Commission that heard Gardner's appeal. He cast the deciding vote in a
two-to-one commission decision. 94 Although no bias was shown and
Gardner took no part in filing the original complaint, 9 the proceeding
was invalidated because of an appearance of bias.
96
Dussia v. Barger97 established that one person cannot both initiate a
prosecution and ultimately determine the accused's guilt or innocence.
The Commissioner of the State Police, Barger, instituted disciplinary
action against Dussia. Although the Court-Martial Board could recom-
mend that Dussia be discharged or reinstated, the ultimate decision lay
with Barger. The court stated,
While in the instant case the Commissioner did not in fact
have the responsibility of the entire prosecutorial role, we do
not believe that this fact alone is sufficient basis for distin-
guishing the instant case from the authorities cited, supra. The
decision to institute a prosecution is such a fundamental prose-
cutorial function that it alone justifies concluding a dual capac-
ity where the individual also is charged with the responsibility
of making the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.
Moreover, it is a decision which requires a judgment as to the
weight of the evidence against the accused, a judgment which is
incompatible with the judicial function of providing an impartial
forum for resolution of the issues presented. 9
discharging Mallon, was exercising an executive power. The judicial review was to come
later after the discharge.
93. 434 Pa. 126, 130, 252 A.2d 704, 706 (1969). Similarly, in Horn v. Township of
Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975), the court disapproved a procedure by which
counsel for one party also advised the hearing body and acted as presiding officer. The
lawyer's involvement in the proceedings was characterized by the Court as follows:
At the hearing board the township was represented by its solicitor, Charles Wilson,
who also served at the hearing as the zoning board's solicitor. Mr. Wilson conduct-
ed the meeting and ruled on evidence presented by appellants and on objections
made to the township's evidence presented by Mr. Wilson, himself, when an
objection was interposed by appellants. Thereafter, Mr. Wilson as the zoning
board's solicitor, advised the board in legal matters concerning appellant's case.
Id. at 747, 337 A.2d at 859.
94. This did not, however, appear to play a significant role in the court's decision.
95. Compare Mackler v. Board of Educ., 16 N.J. Super. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954), in
which the court held that two members of the reviewing board could bring the charges if
they had no personal interest in the prosecution and their filing of the charges was a mere
formality. Gardner not only did not have a personal interest in the outcome, but did not even
file the charges. Nevertheless, he was still disqualified.
96. The supreme court quoted from Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Cas., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) as follows: " '[Any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and
controversies must not only be unbiased but must avoid even the appearance of bias. "434
Pa. at 129, 252 A.2d at 706.
97. 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975).
98. 466 Pa. at 165, 351 A.2d at 674.
(b) The commonwealth court decisions concerning commingling within
an individual.-In contrast with its ambivalent attitude in general
commingling situations, the commonwealth court has adhered to the
supreme court standard concerning commingling within a single individu-
al. It has struck down procedures in which counsel for the agency
represented the complainants before the hearing panel and also advised
the hearing panel on legal matters; 99 in which an individual represented
one of the contesting parties, presided at the hearing, and advised the
hearing board;' 00 and in which a single person combined the roles of
prosecutor and advisor to the adjudicatory panel. 101
The commonwealth court, in contrast to other courts, considers
presiding at the hearing and ruling upon evidence a function that could
have a significant impact upon the board's adjudication.1°2 It has also
distinguished between "preparing" charges and "filing" them. 0 3 Filing
charges makes one the prosecutor; a person who has predetermined the
accused's guilt. Preparing charges, however, is a formal function that
entails no personal determination of guilt or innocence. It is a mechan-
ical, passive role with no inconsistent functions. Thus, a person who has
prepared charges may also adjudicate and still avoid the appearance of
bias. Because he did not assume a more active part in the prosecutory
stage, the prosecuting officer's role in Barr v. Pine Township Board of
Supervisors104 was harmless.
(c) Summary of the Pennsylvania standard.-The state supreme court
has established a very high standard for commingling. Basing its holdings
99. Commonwealth, Human Relations Comm'n v. Feeser, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 406,
341 A.2d 584 (1975), vacated, 469 Pa. 173, 364 A.2d 1324 (1976) (the supreme court vacated
the commonwealth court decision on an interpretation of the facts, not the law). This
decision indicates that the commonwealth court would now decide Cherbel Realty Corp. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 285 A.2d 905 (1972), differently. In Cherbel the
court required a showing of actual bias on almost the identical facts.
100. Donnon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971).
101. In re Feldman, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 451, 346 A.2d 895 (1975); Commonwealth,
Department of State v. Chairman, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 377 A.2d 1022 (1977).
102. Compare Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970) with
Donnon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971). The court in
Citta implied that the role of presiding officer was a relatively passive one and not
incompatible with a prosecutory function. In Donnon, on the other hand, the court accepted
the reasoning of the trial judge when he opined,
There is no showing on the instant record that the Borough solicitor acted as a
judge in the sense that he participated in the ultimate decision of the Commission.
However, in a less restrictive sense, he did act in that capacity when he conducted
the hearings for the Commission and therein ruled upon the admissibility of
evidence and all other questions of a legal nature which were then presented.
Whether he actually participated in the rendering of the ultimate decision is
unimportant. At the time that decision was made he was in a position from which it
was possible for him and his employer, the Borough, to have exerted influence
upon it.
3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 369-70, 283 A.2d at 94.
103. Barr v. Pine Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 255, 341 A.2d 581
(1975).
104. Id.
upon In re Murchison,"°5 it has consistently struck down administrative
procedures accepted in other jurisdictions. 0 6 It imposes a duty upon the
agency to adequately separate functions' 0 7 and has never allowed an
individual to perform two incompatible roles. The steadfast refusal of the
supreme court to permit even the appearance of bias insures that no
improper influences occur.
The commonwealth court, however, has intentionally adopted a
two-tiered standard. It has employed the Withrow standard requiring
actual bias in general commingling situations, but adheres to the supreme
court standard in cases when commingling occurs in one individual from
the same agency. When internal bifurcation occurs, the commonwealth
court has shown varying degrees of concern in a few cases.108 Further-
more, to the extent that the commonwealth court does not consider ex
parte influences when one attorney prosecutes and the other advises the
hearing panel, it countenances a serious risk of bias. It has, however,
consistently refused to allow an individual to discharge two inconsistent
functions. Only when the commonwealth court fully adopts the supreme
court's precedent will the constitutional rights of a litigant who appears
before an administrative body be properly protected.
C. The Standard of Other State Jurisdictions
1. A Combination of Functions within an Agency. -Professor
Davis has succinctly characterized the majority of state jurisdictions as
follows:
State courts, like federal courts, generally hold, with only
occasional exceptions, that due process does not forbid the
combination with judging of such functions as prosecuting,
investigating, and accusing, although language in state court
opinions mildly disapproving such combinations is common.
State courts differ from federal in two important respects: some
state courts hold that the combination of inconsistent functions
calls for a closer scrutiny or judicial review, and the rule of
necessity is often invoked . .. . 9
105. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
106. Compare In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961) with In re Duncan,
541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976). Compare Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975)
with Sevigny v. City of Biddeford, 344 A.2d 34 (Me. 1975).
107. State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974). The supreme court has not delineated specifically what internal separation means.
See note 33 supra. The commonwealth court has gone beyond the supreme court's bare
language in Commonwealth, Dept. of Ins. v. American Bankers Ins., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct.
189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976), invalidating a procedure using internal bifurcation since the
functions were separated.
108. See notes 85-91 and accompanying text supra,
109. 2 K. DAVIS, AoMINISRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02 at 181 (1958). The rule of
necessity is invoked if no other body could adjudicate the charges when the tribunal charged
with bias is disqualified. Although it may be partial, the administrative body is allowed to
perform the judicial function. 46 WASH. L. REV. 411, 421 (1969).
Cases illustrative of the state position are as follows: State v. Johnson, 345 So. 2d 1069
(Fla. 1977); School Committee of Stoughton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, - Mass. App. Ct.
Although the federal and state standard is virtually identical, there are a
few exceptions.
110
2. A Combination of Functions within Two Individuals in the
Same Agency.-The courts that have encountered situations in which
commingling occurs in two employees of the same agency have rendered
contradictory opinions. Some courts declare that this type of commin-
gling is not a per se violation of due process and will only invalidate the
proceeding when actual bias appears in the record."'l Thus, in Brownlee
v. Williams, 112 a procedure in which one assistant county attorney repre-
sented the county before the County Civil Service Commission and
another county attorney advised the Commission was held to be constitu-
tional since a careful examination of the record revealed no bias. Similar-
ly, in Felin Associates, Inc. v. Altman,' 3 the court summarily dismissed
the appellant's claim that a combination of prosecutory and adjudicatory
functions was improper, noting that the facts did not show a denial of a
full hearing. 
114
A contrary result was reached by the West Virginia Supreme Court
in State v. Kelly.115 In Kelly the Deputy Commissioner to the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles presided at the hearing of a case that the
Commissioner investigated and prosecuted. The court was incredulous
that impartiality might be maintained in such a proceeding. The presiding
officer's status as employee of the Commission was a major factor in the
court's decision. Since he was subject to the Commissioner's control, he
could not be expected to be impartial and independent.
-, 346 N.E.2d 129 (1976); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich, 665, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977); Ruden v.
Nevada Real Estate Advisory Comm'n, 86 Nev. 562, 471 P.2d 658 (1970); Quinn v. City of
Concord, 108 N.H. 242, 233 A.2d 106 (1967) (contra to In re Schlesinger on almost identical
facts); In re Blum, 109 N.J. Super. 125, 262 A.2d 431 (1970); Seidenberg v. New Nexico Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469 (1969); Strongin v. Nyquist, 54 App. Div.
2d 1031, 388 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1976); Miller Properties v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 34 Ohio
App. 2d 113, 296 N.E.2d 300 (1972).
110. In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Mo. 1976) ("a fair trial and a fair tribunal are
essential to due process and the combination of prosecutor and judge in one body creates a
high probability of unfairness"). City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 261 Ind. 670, 681, 310
N.E.2d 65, 71 (1974) ("some prior involvement in a case should not render one per se
ineligible to participate in the decision making, but the complaining party or agency in an
adversary proceeding should not be permitted to do so"). But see Lueken v. City of
Huntingberg, 335 N.E.2d 239 (Ind. App. 1975); State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wash. 2d
313, 318, 456 P.2d 322, 325 (1969) ("both [two precedents] give rise to the disqualification of
a tribunal, where as here, it is made to appear that the hearing tribunal is composed of an
individual or individuals who investigated, accused, prosecuted and would judge the
controversy involved").
111. E.g., Brownlee v. Williams, 233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359 (1975).
112. Id.
113. 41 App. Div. 2d 825, 342 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1973) (memorandum opinion).
114. In addition, the court found no error when the superior of both attorneys appeared
at the hearing, since he only advised the prosecuting attorney and made no statement for the
record. Id. at -, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
115. 145 W. Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1960).
3. A Combination of Functions within the Same Individual.-
Although some courts have great difficulty in accepting commingling
within an individual," 6 other jurisdictions easily accept that very same
combination."' In City of Mishawaka v. Stewart,"'8 the court rejected
the practice of allowing an individual to prosecute and also sit on the
board that adjudicates the charges. The city attorney framed the charges,
conducted cross-examination, ruled upon the admissibility of evidence,
and voted upon the accused's guilt. Disregarding whether he had cast the
deciding vote, the court concluded that the degree of prejudice resulting
from this commingling could not be quantified in such a simplistic
fashion.
Conversely, the Supreme Court of Maine, in Sevigny v. City of
Biddeford, 9 held it permissible for a mayor to bring charges and preside
at the hearing, provided that he was impartial at the adjudicative stage of
the proceedings. Although the court found actual bias, its ready accept-
ance of a commingling of two inconsistent functions within an individual
is open to criticism. It is difficult to perceive how the mayor could decide
the case solely from an independent presentation of the evidence at the
hearing after having been intimately involved in the prosecutory stage.
There would always be the question of bias tainting the proceeding.
The better reasoning would invalidate such procedures to eliminate
not only any bias, but also any influences of ex parte communications not
presented at the hearing and not reflected in the record. A mere reliance
by an appellate court upon an examination of the record under these
circumstances would be an insufficient safeguard for due process.
4. Procedures not Involving a Combination of Functions.-State
courts have also addressed situations in which the agency performed
merely investigatory functions 120 or provided adequate separation of
functions."'2 Neither of these, of course, raises any serious question of
due process. 1
22
116. See Nider v. Homan, 32 Cal. App. 2d 11, 89 P.2d 136 (1939). But see Thompson v.
City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 235, 259 P.2d 649 (1953); Thompson v. Industrial Comm'n,
33 Colo. App. 369, 520 P.2d 139 (1974); City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 261 Ind. 670, 310
N.E.2d 65 (1974); School Committee of Stoughton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, - Mass.
App. Ct. -, 346 N.E.2d 129 (1976) (dicta); Burhoe v. Whaland, 116 N.H. 222, 356 A.2d 658
(1976).
117. See, e.g., Sevigny v. City of Biddeford, 344 A.2d 34 (Me. 1975); Texas State Bd.
of Dental Examiners v. Fieldsmith, 386 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (dentist was not
denied due process when a board member investigated the charges and sat on the Board,
since the statute gives the Board authority to investigate, make complaints, and revoke a
license for any situation enumerated in the statute).
118. 261 Ind. 670, 310 N.E.2d 65 (1974).
119. 344 A.2d 34 (Me. 1975).
120. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973); Human Rights Comm'n of
Worchester v. Assad, - Mass. -, 349 N.E.2d 341 (1976).
121. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973).
122. It is noteworthy that different courts do not always find the same functions in the
same procedures. For example, the supreme courts of Missouri, Louisiana, and Pennsylva-
III. The Statutory Response to the Commingling Situation
A. The Federal Response
Section 554(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act contains the
congressional response to commingling of functions.123 The Act forbids
any employee who investigates or prosecutes a case to act as an advisor or
adjudicator in that case or a factually related one.' 24 It also prohibits any
employee performing an investigatory or prosecutory function from
supervising another engaged in an adjudicatory role. The Act, however,
exempts from the provisions of this section the members of the commis-
sion or board, as compared to employees, of the agency. Thus, agency
heads may actively participate in all phases of a case. This deliberate
exception was intended to take advantage of the members' expertise and
experience.125 Although the drafters of the Act found that this con-
sideration outweighed any bias that might result from the practice, their
conclusion has not gone uncriticized and it has been recommended that
agency heads avoid any participation in the investigatory or accusatory
stages. 126
nia considered essentially the same disbarment procedure and came to different conclusions
about which functions were present. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the State
Commission on Retirement, Removal, and Discipline only exercised investigatory and
adjudicatory functions. In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976). The Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded that the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana performed only an investigat-
ory function. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded that all three functions, investigatory, prosecutory, and adjudicatory were
present in this procedure. In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
Some courts further divide a specific function. In Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d
1073 (5th Cir. 1976), the court, in rejecting the appellant's claim of an impermissible
commingling of functions within the Board, said, "in view of the Board's position as a
decision maker, and not as an adjudicator between contesting parties, Megill's claim of the
Board's partiality is without merit." Id. at 1079.
123. The statutory language, in pertinent part, reads,
Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized
by law, such an employee [the adjudicator] may not-
(I) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate; or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency.
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case,
participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review
pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceed-
ings. This subsection does not apply-
(c) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the
agency.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970).
124. "Factually-related case" means two or more cases arising from the same set of
facts. It does not mean that investigators or prosecutors could not advise in a case merely
because its facts are similar to cases they have investigated or prosecuted previously. T.
CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 54 n.6
(1947).
125. Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with Administrative
Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REV. 233, 251 (1962).
126. See Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J. 652,654 (1965).
B. Pennsylvania Statutory Law Governing Administrative Procedures
Pennsylvania does not statutorily proscribe the commingling of
functions within a local or state agency'27 with the sole exception of the
Public Utility Commission. 128 The Local Agency Law 29 and the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law 130 have established certain due process stan-
dards for these bodies,' 3 ' but they establish only the right to notice and
opportunity to be heard, 3 2 the right to be represented by counsel,133 the
need for all opinions of these bodies to be in writing accompanied by the
reasons for the decision, 134 and the right to appeal to the appropriate
court."13 Other due process considerations are left to the discretion of the
agency.
In 1976 the General Assembly enacted Act No. 216,136 a measure
designed to reform procedures used by the Public Utility Commission,
which adopted almost verbatim the commingling section of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act. 137 Although currently limited to the PUC,
127. Similarly, the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, adopted by a
significant number of states, provides no protection against commingling of functions but
does eliminate ex parte communications between agency adjudicators and parties involved
in the case. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (U.L.A.) § 13 (1961). In fact,
the employees are specifically exempted from the provisions of the section.
128. Some state agencies, because of overriding considerations of public welfare, may
make orders, refuse permits, or determine a party's rights without having to provide the
procedural safeguard of a hearing before the agency's determination. For example, the
Department of Environmental Resources may combine functions in this manner and is
specifically excused from the requirements of The Administrative Agency Law PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71 § 510-21(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). The Department must provide, however, an
independent review of the agency's decision before it becomes final. The Environmental
Hearing Board is the Department's internal body charged with the sole function of hearing
appeals from departmental orders. Id. The members of the Board must devote full time to
their position. Id. § 180-2 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11301 (Purdon 1972).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.1 (Purdon 1972).
131. Certain agencies are excepted. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.50 (Purdon Supp.
1977-78).
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.31 (Purdon 1972) (state agencies); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11304 (Purdon 1972) (local agencies).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.11 (Purdon 1972) (state agencies); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11303 (Purdon 1972) (local agencies).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1719.34 (Purdon 1972) (state agencies); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11306 (Purdon 1972) (local agencies).
135. Appeals from decisions of a state agency are heard by the commonwealth court.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.508(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78). The decisions of a local agency
may be appealed to the court of common pleas within the jurisdiction of the local agency.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11307 (Purdon 1972).
136. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, P.L. 1075, No. 216.
137. The relevant state statutory language provides in pertinent part,
(b) Save to the extent required for the disposition of ex-parte matters not
prohibited by this act, no presiding officer shall consult any person or party on any
fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; nor
shall any presiding officer be responsible to or subject to the supervision or
direction of any officer, employe, or agent engaged in the performance of inves-
tigative or prosecuting functions for the commission. No employe, appointee,
commissioner, or official engaged in the service of, or in any manner connected
with the commission shall engage in ex-parte communications save to the extent
permitted by this act. No officer, employe, or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for the commission in any case shall, in that
or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
this commingling provision, which provides an internal separation of
functions, is a positive step toward eliminating bias in administrative
proceedings that should be extended to all agencies, state and local,
within the Commonwealth.' 3 8
The Senate Consumer Affairs Committee's Report, 139 upon which
the legislation was based, made some additional recommendations affect-
ing commingling within the PUC. Before the new Act, the hearing officer
simply presided at the hearing to control the admission of evidence. 140
The Committee proposed, and its proposal was eventually accepted, that
the office of administrative law judge, patterned after the federal model,
be created. When he acts in place of the Commissioners, the presiding
officer is now entitled to make a tentative decision and submit it to the
Commission.' 4' Both the Committee and the legislature could have gone
further, however, and provided that the administrative law judge's find-
ings of fact be conclusive. If the hearing is truly to serve as a "trial
court,' 142 the judge should have been given greater independence. It
serves not only to separate functions within the agency, but also to further
other agency purposes. 1 43 Current procedures also allow the Commission
to hear a case de novo on appeal. '44
The Committee attempted to reform the structure of the Law Bureau
by establishing three separate sections consisting of a Hearing Section, an
decision or commission review, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.
(c) Ex-parte communications prohibited by this act shall mean any off-the-
record communications to or by any member of the commission, administrative
law judge, or employee of the commission, regarding the merits or any fact in issue
of any matter pending before the commission in any contested on-the-record
proceeding.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 458.5 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
138. This solution should not apply, of course, to agencies that must combine the
prosecutory and adjudicatory functions in the interests of protecting the public welfare. See
note 128 supra.
139. SENATE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SENATE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEE To REFORM THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMIS-
SION, S.R. SER. No. 33, 159th GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1975).
140. Id. at 29.
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 458.6(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
142. SENATE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITrEE REPORT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SENATE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITrEE TO REFORM THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMIS-
SION, S.R. SER. No. 33, 159th GENERAL ASSEMBLY 30 (1975).
143. The following reasons have been advanced for making the judge's findings of fact
conclusive:
At the appeal deciding stage, greater deference should be accorded to the
findings made by hearing examiners on disputed issues of fact the resolution of
which does not call for application of the accumulated experience and special
knowledge of the agency. A hearing examiner should be regarded as the agency's
special master on fact questions. The independence of hearing examiners, specifi-
cally their isolation from the complaint-issuance process, is a substantial safeguard
against unfairness in administrative adjudication. We strengthen that safeguard
and at the same time help the agency members concentrate on their basic function
of formulating law and policy, by attaching greater finality to examiners' findings
on strictly factual questions. To the extent that agency members limit their roles as
judges of particular facts, they enlarge their primary roles as administrators.
Elman, supra note 126, at 654-55.
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 458.6(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
Advisory Section, and a Trial Section. 145 Although this provision could
have significantly eliminated the commingling problem, it was not incor-
porated into the Act. Rather, the legislature opted for a "multi-function
legal staff, consisting of a prosecutory function and advisory func-
tion." 14 The prosecutory counsel handles the functions of the proposed
Hearing Section, and the Advisory Counsel handles the duties of both the
proposed Advisory Section and the Trial Section. A combination of these
conflicting functions in one staff presents a potential problem of
commingling. Decisions could easily be influenced by ex parte communi-
cations between prosecutors and the advisors, who have a significant
impact on the Commission's ultimate decision. Providing a formal sep-
aration of functions internally would not only have avoided an appearance
of bias, but would have also avoided what the commonwealth court
described as "the interface between a constitutionally permissible and a
constitutionally impermissible commingling of prosecutorial and ad-
judicatory functions."
147
IV. Proposed Reforms of the Administrative Process
Initially, administrative agencies must be distinguished from courts
of law. Agencies were established to combine functions to a limited
degree and to take advantage of the expertise of their members and
employees in overseeing the special field entrusted to their care. 148 To the
extent that functions are separated, this expertise is lost. Even a local
agency such as a school board is affected by this consideration. 4 9 Thus,
to separate functions would eliminate a principal purpose of an agency.
Several proposals have been advanced that attempt to balance these
competing interests. 50 First, some commentators advocate the creation
of a totally independent administrative court that would hear cases from
various agencies, 5 ' thus eliminating the commingling problem by isolat-
ing the adjudicatory role. Although this concept has been criticized
145. SENATE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SENATE CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO REFORM THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMIS-
SION, S.R. SER. No. 33, 159th GENERAL ASSEMBLY 40 (1975).
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 457.3(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
147. Commonwealth, Human Relations Comm'n v. Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, 25 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 295, 302, 361 A.2d 497, 501 (1976).
148. Bagge, supra note 4, at 587.
149. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass 'n, 426 U.S. 482
(1976).
150. These proposals never directly addressed the commingling issue, but by separat-
ing inconsistent functions they do help to minimize that problem.
151. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YALE L.J. 931 (1960). The Pennsylvania Department of Justice, aware of the commingling
problem and other defects in the present state system, has drafted a proposed act creating an
Office of Administrative Hearings utilizing this arrangement. It was based upon recom-
mendations contained in a report to the Department. See J. MALLAMUD & M.M. CARROW,
FINAL REPORT: A SYSTEM OF PROVIDING HEARING OFFICERS FOR ADJUDICATORY TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 113 (1975).
because of increased cost, 152 there are indications that this structure
would not add greatly to the present price of administrative adjudica-
tion.' 5 3 Furthermore, when due process rights are endangered, cost
should not be determinative. "' The most serious obstacle to an indepen-
dent court is the separation of adjudication from policy-making. 5 5 There
is a distinct danger that the court could eventually rival the agency in
formulating policy by use of its adjudicatory powers.156 Other disadvan-
tages may be the loss of expertise when judges hear cases from all
agencies' 57 and the loss of the participation of qualified administrators in
adjudication since, presumably, a position narrowly confined to an ad-
judicatory function would be less attractive to qualified personnel. 58
Second, some observers, emphasizing the problems with an inde-
pendent court, consider the status quo the best solution. 5 9 These
commentators, however, rely upon their own experience in the federal
system and cannot be considered proponents of the status quo in juris-
dictions like Pennsylvania that have no rule generally prohibiting
commingling within administrative bodies.
The best solution would be a formal internal separation within the
agency.'6° Any procedure that gives an administrative body free rein to
prosecute and adjudicate entails a grave risk of bias. Yet, in keeping with
the purpose and intent of administrative agencies and to maintain consis-
tency of policy, the adjudicative role should not be separated from the
administrative body. A formal internal separation, therefore, is a rea-
sonable compromise that provides protection against commingling. It
also more than satisfies the standard of the Pennsylvania Supreme
152. Carey, Why I Oppose the Divorce of the Judicial Function from Federal Regulatory
Agencies, 51 A.B.A.J. 33 (1965).
153. Costs might be reduced through an independent administrative court for the
following reasons: the case load would be balanced by transferring judges to the more
heavily burdened agencies; there would be less need for law libraries, docket offices, and
hearing rooms; and there would be greater uniformity in office space, secretarial and law
clerk assistance. Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases before Several Agencies--Odyssey of an Adminis-
trative Law Judge, 27 AD. L. REV. 217, 222 (1975).
154. Ross, Should Prosecutors Write Agency Opinions? The Role of Agency Counsel in
Decision-Making, 22 AD. L. REV. 579, 582 (1970).
155. Carey, supra note 152, at 34; Elman, supra note 126, at 656.
156. Presumably, this may occur when an agency has established a policy, taken a
violator before the administrative tribunal and finds that the court, in opposition to the
agency, renders a verdict for the individual litigant, thereby negating the agency's policy and
establishing its own on a case by case basis.
157. Pfeiffer, supra note 153, at 223.
158. Carey, supra note 152, at 37. Paradoxically, the creation of an independent court
has been suggested as a way of attracting better personnel to the adjudicatory role. The
reasoning is that hearing cases from different agencies would be more attractive than simply
working for the same bureaucracy in only one field of regulation. Pfeiffer, supra note 153,
at 222.
159. Supporters of the status quo also rely upon the voluntary measures adopted by
their agencies that are stricter than the Administrative Procedure Act. Bagge, supra note 4;
Kahn, Should Prosecutors Write Agency Opinions ? The Role of Agency Counsel in Decision-
Making, 22 AD. L. REV. 591 (1970).
160. See Elman, supra note 126.
Court. ' 6' If the agency's-size does not justify an internal separation, then
it could be required to surrender the investigatory and prosecutory func-
tions to an outside body. 
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The personal conduct of the agency's members should conform to
the highest standard of fairness. If one member of the adjudicatory body
has filed the complaint, he should disqualify himself. If the entire body
has made a determination of guilt, then the controversy should go directly
to the appropriate court of appeal.163 These procedures should insure a
high standard of impartiality.
V. Conclusion
The commingling of functions within an administrative agency pre-
sents a serious due process problem. Federal courts have allowed these
combinations and have placed the burden on the individual litigant to
rebut a presumption of fairness and integrity in the administrative proc-
ess. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set a stricter standard for
commingling within local and state agencies. Agencies may exercise
inconsistent functions, but these functions must be adequately separated.
Thus, the traditional unity of the agency is preserved while the due
process rights of litigants are also protected. The commonwealth court
could add to this protection by consistently adhering to the supreme
court's appearance of bias standard. Currently, the commonwealth
court's two-tiered commingling standard seriously impairs a litigant's due
process rights in general commingling situations.
The General Assembly could also provide additional protection by
statutorily prohibiting commingling in all agencies within the Common-
wealth. The current prohibition, which applies only to the PUC, could
easily be extended to all administrative bodies in the state. This would
insure that all litigants, whether they stood before an administrative
tribunal or a court of law, received the full and fair trial that due process
demands.
BERNARD J. DONOHUE
161. See State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974).
162. This was the procedure followed in Wasniewski v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7
Pa. Commw. Ct. 166, 299 A.2d 676 (1973); and State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v.
Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974).
163. This procedure was followed in State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wash. 2d 313,
456 P.2d 322 (1969).
